THE VC THAT NEVER WAS

by Dominic Walsh

As Theodore Cooke and Edward Bamford waited for HMS Vindictive to 
reach the Mole at Zeebrugge, they must have felt much the same 
mixture of excitement and fear as a Forlorn Hope, those gallant 
soldiers who more than a century before had volunteered to lead the 
assault on besieged fortresses during Wellington's campaign in the 
Peninsula. 

Just as the Mole was reached, these two young Royal Marine officers, 
both from Portsmouth Division, were given the job of leading the 
attack after heavy casualties in Plymouth Division on the 
Vindictive's final run in forced a last-minute change of plan. They 
must have realised there was a pretty good chance they would be 
killed before they had the opportunity to do what they had spent 
months preparing for. But that was what being a Royal Marine officer 
meant - leading from the front, whatever the odds - and when the cry 
of "Over you go, Royals!" finally came, they were not found wanting.

Lt Cooke, in command of 5 Platoon, and Capt Bamford, the Portsmouth 
company commander, led the way by swarming up the specially designed 
gangways and leaping on to the parapet of the Mole. The official 
reports talk of a "galling fire" from the German defensive positions 
as Cooke and his men rushed along the top of the exposed parapet and 
casualties were heavy. However, they were able to silence a party of 
snipers who had been doing great damage to the assault party. They 
also gave sufficient covering fire to give the platoons behind them 
the breathing space they needed to get into position.

Under Bamford, whose "totally unperturbed manner" is said to have had 
a galvanising effect on his men, several platoons formed up for an 
attack on the heavily fortified position at the end of the mole. But 
by now 5 Platoon's advance party had become the focus of enemy 
machine gun fire in an area without any real cover. Cooke, though 
wounded himself, endeavoured to carry one of his stricken men back to 
the ship, but as he did so he was dangerously hit in the head and 
rendered temporarily unconscious. 

It was only thanks to the efforts of his batman, Private Press, that he regained the Vindictive - an act for which Press was awarded the Conspicuous Gallantry Medal. Bamford, meanwhile, had somehow remained almost unscathed and was able to supervise the orderly return to the ship of the men once the recall had sounded.

REWARDS

For his part in the famous Zeebrugge Raid on the 23rd March 1918 - St 
George's Day - Cooke earned the DSO, the French Croix de Guerre with 
palme, a mention in despatches and he was specially promoted to major 
by brevet.

All this may seem a lot for little more than an hour's work, but my investigations suggest that he was in fact deprived of the ultimate accolade - the Victoria Cross - by a rather unfortunate 
administrative blunder.

Such was the courage of the 700 or so members of the 4th Battalion RM 
that took part in the raid that it was decided to invoke Article 13 
of the Royal Warrant governing its award. This stipulates that, when 
a corps or unit so distinguishes itself as to make it impossible to 
single out individuals, crosses should be awarded by a ballot of 
those who survived.

When the ballot was completed, it was announced that his comrade-in-arms, Captain Bamford, who had already won the 
DSO at Jutland, and Norman Finch, an RMA sergeant who had kept his 
pom-pom firing from the Vindictive's foretop throughout the attack, 
were to be awarded the VC.

The citations for these gallant marines, as you would expect, are 
fulsome in their praise, but that of Bamford is materially wrong in 
that it says he was "selected by the officers of the RMA and RMLI 
detachments to receive the Victoria Cross under Rule 13 of the Royal 
Warrant, dated 29th January 1856". That of Finch appears to be more 
accurate in declaring that he was chosen "by the 4th Battalion of 
Royal Marines", although I believe this was actually meant to imply 
that he was selected by his fellow NCOs and other ranks. The reality 
is that only one ballot of the entire battalion - officers and men 
alike - was actually held, in clear contravention of Rule 13 which 
dictated that the officers should select one officer and the rest of 
the men one NCO or other rank. 

A confidential report of how the ballot was organised was 
subsequently compiled by Captain (later Major General) Arthur Chater, 
the 4th Battalion's adjutant. According to Chater, two days after the 
raid a phone call came through from the Dover headquarters of Vice-
Admiral Roger Keyes, who masterminded the raid, that the battalion 
was to elect one member of the battalion to receive the VC, and that 
he would himself would come down to Deal to address the men and make 
the announcement of who had won.

This erroneous order to elect a single VC was later confirmed by telephone from the Royal Marines Office and on the 26th April the men were paraded, given a slip of paper and told to write on it the name of the person they felt was most deserving. Bamford, as the senior company commander, was detailed to supervise the collection and counting of the slips while Chater and Major Bernard Weller, the acting CO following the death of Lt.Col Bertram Elliott and Major Alexander Cordner early in the raid, retired to the mess drawing room.

Chater goes on to explain how a rather embarrassed Bamford later came 
into the mess and handed to Weller the piece of paper on which the 
votes had been tallied: the greatest number of votes had been cast 
for Bamford himself. This news was immediately relayed to Admiral 
Keyes' office and the next day the battalion was paraded in 
preparation for Keyes' arrival. But when the admiral arrived, he 
informed Weller that two VCs were to be awarded and asked who was to 
get the second. After a quick chat with Chater, Weller told him that 
Finch would receive it and the admiral duly announced the decision to 
the assembled battalion.

In his report, Chater admits that the citation for Bamford is wrong, 
adding: "The officers, who discussed the matter before the voting, 
voted for Lieutenant T.F.V Cooke, who led the assault along the top 
of the sea wall and was twice wounded."

There is also some confusion over the number of votes each man 
received. The original parchment, which is still to be seen in the 
Royal Marines Museum, is sadly very faded and almost illegible in 
parts, although a note in the Museum archives says that Bamford got 
100 votes and Finch 87. Strangely, a typed copy of the votes cast 
shows Bamford receiving only 64, although I suppose it is possible 
that this may be because that particular part of the parchment had 
faded by the time a typed copy was made. Cooke, meanwhile, appears to 
have received just five votes, although it may be that, again, some 
of his votes had become illegible. It is also likely that some of the 
officers who had decided to choose him may then subsequently have 
plumped for Sgt Finch when it was announced that a single ballot was 
to be held.

Why it was that Bamford won the votes of so many of the NCOs and men 
and Cooke so few is difficult to assess so long after the event. 
Perhaps, Bamford was simply more popular. Or maybe Cooke's wounding 
so early in the raid meant fewer men witnessed his deeds while 
Bamford's luck in avoiding serious injury allowed him to carry on 
rallying the troops and eventually supervising their re-embarkation.
There is further evidence that some of Cooke's fellow officers felt 
that he, rather than Bamford, should have received the VC. In a 
letter to the Globe & Laurel, the corps magazine, shortly after his 
death in 1959, an unnamed correspondent - possibly Chater - says 
that "Cooke, though small of stature, was fearless and of exceptional 
determination", adding: "But for a mischance he would have received 
the VC." 

Moreover, Cooke's daughter, Doreen, recounts how another veteran of 
the raid, Sergeant-Major Thatcher, who received the DSC, used to come 
and visit her father regularly after the war and  "always told Daddy 
he should have got the VC".

Keyes himself later confided in private correspondence that, if he 
had been allowed to select the VCs that were elected by ballot - two 
Naval crosses were also decided by Rule 13 - he would not necessarily 
have made the same selections, although he did add that he was 
perfectly satisfied by the way things had turned out.

But perhaps, most compelling of all is an extract from the official 
report of the raid by Major Weller, on which the London Gazette 
citation for Cooke's DSO was based. He writes: "Lieutenant T.F.V. 
Cooke by his personal behaviour under fire set a magnificent example 
to his men, and led them forward with the greatest dash in spite of 
being wounded. He was wounded a second time whilst endeavouring to 
carry a wounded man back to the ship. I consider this officer to be 
worthy of the highest award." 

It is evident that Cooke did not receive the highest award, although 
there can be little doubt that his behaviour during the epic attack 
on Zeebrugge on St George's Day 1918 certainly merited it.